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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

“LAWYERS” NOT “LIARS”: A MODIFIED TRADITIONALIST
APPROACH TO TEACHING LEGAL ETHICS

LONNIE T. BROWN, JR.*

INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 1998, I met a gentleman named Delroy Sheriffe.
My wife and I were vacationing in Jamaica, and Delroy was the head bartender
at the hotel where we were staying. Over the course of our weeklong visit, we
got to know Delroy quite well, and he shared numerous entertaining tales with
us. His most memorable comment, however, was uttered in response to my
telling him that I was a lawyer. In a heavy Jamaican accent, Delroy mockingly
proclaimed: “Ah, a lawyer! I tell you the truth and you tell lies for me.”
Although this statement was surely made in jest, it was apparent to me that
Delroy really believed that his characterization of an attorney’s role was
accurate.
The timing of my encounter with Delroy was particularly fortuitous
because it closely preceded my first semester teaching professional
responsibility. His words served as a reminder to me of what I have come to
recognize as the widely held, negative perception of lawyers by the public.1
Clients can confidentially tell us their deepest, darkest, nastiest secrets, and it is
our job to do everything in our power to obtain the outcome that they desire,

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. J.D., Vanderbilt Law
School, 1989; B.A., Emory University, 1986. I would like to thank my legal ethics colleague and
mentor Professor C. Ronald Ellington for his perceptive comments on an earlier draft of this
article. In addition, I would like to express special thanks to my wife Kim, who has assisted and
inspired my development as a teacher more than anyone else.
1. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 4 (2000) (observing that “[o]nly a fifth of those surveyed by the American Bar
Association (ABA) felt that lawyers could be described as ‘honest and ethical’”); Harry T.
Edwards, A Lawyer’s Duty to Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1148, 1149 (1990)
(“Lawyers certainly deserve all the criticism they can get. . . . Those are universally held feelings
by everyone who has ever dealt with the legal establishment.”) (quoting Marlin Fitzwater, Press
Secretary to President George H. W. Bush); Allen K. Harris, The Professionalism Crisis—The
“Z” Words and Other Rambo Tactics: The Conference of Chief Justices’ Solution, 53 S.C. L.
REV. 549, 561 (2002) (observing that it is well documented that “a disturbingly high percentage of
the American public has lost confidence in lawyers”).
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including lie.2 The fact that Delroy and other non-lawyers consider this to be
the true nature of my chosen calling troubled me, but not so much as my
recognition that many within the profession itself cling to a similar
misconception.3

2. See RHODE, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that one of the most negative traits that the public
associates with lawyers is a “willingness to manipulate the system on behalf of clients without
regard to right or wrong”); see also ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF
LAWYERS: CONSUMER RESEARCH FINDINGS 7–8 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/
litigation/lawyers/publicperceptions.pdf (indicating that survey results suggest, among other
things, “that lawyers have a reputation for winning at all costs” and “are believed to manipulate
both the system and the truth”); Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., “May It Please the Camera, . . . I Mean the
Court”—An Intrajudicial Solution to an Extrajudicial Problem, 39 GA. L. REV. 83, 134 (2004)
(observing that the practice of attorneys making groundless statements to the media on behalf of
clients may result in lawyers being “viewed as unscrupulous mouthpieces who will say almost
anything to advocate their positions before the court of public opinion”); Kevin Cole & Fred C.
Zacharias, The Agony of Victory and the Ethics of Lawyer Speech, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1627, 1667
(1996) (suggesting that “the more the public feels (correctly or incorrectly) that attorneys speak
dishonestly on behalf of their clients, the less we can expect the public . . . to trust lawyers’
assertions”).
Although the ethics rules do not expressly use the pejorative term “lie,” various
provisions clearly indicate that lying, in the fundamental sense, is prohibited. See MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”); id. at R. 3.3(a)(1) (“A
lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a
false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer . . . .”); id. at
R. 3.3(a)(3) (prohibiting lawyers from in any way participating in the knowing presentation of
false evidence to the court and requiring the initiation of reasonable remedial measures in the
event that the lawyer discovers the falsity after the evidence has been offered); id. at R. 3.4(b) (“A
lawyer shall not . . . falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an
inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law . . . .”); id. at R. 4.1 (“In the course of
representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or
law to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.”); id.
at R. 7.1 (“A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer’s services.”); id. at R. 8.4(c) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation . . . .”). It should be noted,
however, that “immaterial” lies are apparently not proscribed by the ethics rules. See, e.g., id. at
R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (observing that “[u]nder generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types
of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact,” such as, “[e]stimates of
price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable
settlement of a claim . . . .”).
All references to the “ethics rules” throughout this Article will be to the American Bar
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which is the principal rule set that I rely
upon in teaching professional responsibility.
3. See, e.g., RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE
AMERICAN LAWYER 3 (1999) (noting that “[w]hile the public looks to the legal system for the
truth, lawyers often look to spin the truth from their clients’ perspectives”); Harris, supra note 1,
at 551 (noting Georgia Supreme Court Justice Hardy Gregory’s observation in modern law
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My personal experience in private practice revealed to me that more than a
few members of the bar regard it as proper to abuse, berate, demean and
intimidate opposing counsel, so long as they have their clients’ wishes and best
interests at heart.4 Indeed, such legal warriors claim that it is their “ethical”
duty to pull out all the stops, no matter what the costs.5 According to them, if

practice of “a new meanness and blind insistence on the rights of clients with a serious lack of a
spirit of compromise and sometimes even common sense”); Jonathan M. Moses, Note, Legal Spin
Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1811, 1849
(1995) (noting Floyd Abrams’s argument that “lawyers are justified in lying to the press about
their clients” given the nature of the adversary process).
4. The concept of neutral partisanship or nonaccountability is resorted to in justification of
such behavior, as it removes all elements of social responsibility from the lawyer’s role. See
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 78 (3d ed. 2004)
(noting Professor Murray Schwartz’s principle of nonaccountability as providing that “[w]hen
acting as an advocate for a client . . . , a lawyer is neither legally, professionally, nor morally
accountable for the means used or the ends achieved”); see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 52 (1988).
5. The classic formulation of this client-centered, hyper-zealous posture is Lord Henry
Brougham’s famous quote regarding his representation in Queen Caroline’s Case:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and
that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all
hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only
duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of
an advocate, he must go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his unhappy
fate to involve his country in confusion.
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 4, at 71–72; see also Harris, supra note 1, at 569–70 (“Zealous
advocacy is the doctrine which excuses, without apology, outrageous and unconscionable conduct
so long as it is done ostensibly for a client, and, of course, for a price.”) (quoting from an order
authored by Illinois Circuit Judge Richard Curry).
Of course, there are defined ethical limits for lawyers, as well as express prohibitions
with regard to the very conduct in which certain zealous advocates feel legally compelled to
engage. Specifically, Model Rule 3.4 provides in pertinent part as follows:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or
conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall
not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;
...
(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably
diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party;
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or
that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in
issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a
cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or
innocence of an accused . . . .
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2007); see also id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (indicating that a
“lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or
preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect”).
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an unfair advantage can be obtained in litigation or negotiation, they have no
choice but to pursue and exploit it, particularly if that is what the client
desires.6
I teach professional responsibility, in large measure, because I am deeply
disturbed by the ubiquitous lay perception expressed by Delroy and even more
appalled by the zealous excesses of counsel that provide evidentiary support
for this tainted impression. My fear is that cadres of young lawyers will
mistakenly identify with this flawed image and will misperceive that it is their
legal duty to push the ethical envelope to its limits and beyond whenever
necessary for the so-called “good” of the client. My mission as a teacher of
legal ethics is to counteract this negative conceptualization of lawyers by
emphasizing the nobleness of our profession, as best demonstrated by the
enormously unique power and opportunity that we possess to serve and protect
the public welfare, in pursuing our private clients’ interests7 and otherwise.8
As attorneys, we undeniably should be faithful confidantes to, and staunch
allies for, our clients,9 but we must also never lose sight of the fact that we are
not simply client representatives; we are concurrently officers of the court and

Furthermore, Model Rule 2.1 makes it very clear that a lawyer’s role in serving a client
includes an obligation to provide wise and candid counsel, even if that is not what the client
seemingly wishes to hear. See id. at R. 2.1. In particular, Rule 2.1 indicates that “[i]n
representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render
candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations
such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s
situation.” Id. Moreover, the comments to the rule provide that “[i]t is proper for a lawyer to
refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice.” Id. at R. 2.1 cmt. 2.
6. But see id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (noting that although a lawyer should zealously represent the
interest of a client, he or she “is not bound . . . to press for every advantage that might be
realized”); id. at R. 4.4(b) cmt. 3 (providing that “[a] lawyer who receives a document relating to
the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document
was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender” and may return the document voluntarily
to the sender in the exercise of his or her professional judgment).
7. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Renewing Our Commitment to the Highest Ideals of the
Legal Profession, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1426 (2006) (acknowledging Justice Louis Brandeis’s
argument that “a lawyer must both participate in the political process and aim to influence private
clients to view their interests in ways that are consistent with the public good”); see also infra
note 10.
8. See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2007) (noting that “[a]
lawyer must . . . act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client’s behalf”); id. at R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (indicating that “[a] fundamental
principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client’s informed consent,
the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representation”); id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (stating
that “[l]oyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a
client”).
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keepers of the public trust.10 Though I strive diligently to make my students
aware of the specific ethical duties owed to clients, I always stress even more
intently the importance of these latter two components of their professional
obligation. They are what set the practice of law apart from other occupations,
and they are what should serve to inspire us to conduct ourselves in a manner
befitting this grand calling.11
The problem, of course, is how does one go about teaching this beyond
merely stating it as a lofty truism? Sophisticated law students will quickly be
turned off by Pollyanna-toned lectures about some seemingly unachievable
legal Utopia. As a result, I think that many legal ethics professors deploy
innovative teaching techniques in an effort to place the subject matter in a
context that can be taken seriously and perceived as real by students. For me,
the most effective pedagogical approach for attaining these objectives has been
to teach professional responsibility in a manner comparable to most
mainstream substantive law school courses, with a few calculated deviations.
I endeavor to convey the critical nuts and bolts of the subject (the rules and
the law) to students by way of the familiar case method, combined with
Socratic dialogue. Though this is anything but pioneering, I suspect that I am
10. See id. at pmbl. ¶ 1 (noting that besides being a representative of his or her clients, a
lawyer is also “an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for
the quality of justice”); Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of
the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1162 (1958) (observing that “partisan advocacy is a
form of public service so long as it aids the process of adjudication; it ceases to be when it
hinders that process, when it misleads, distorts and obfuscates, when it renders the task of the
deciding tribunal not easier, but more difficult”); Anthony T. Kronman, The Law as a Profession,
in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 29, 32
(Deborah L. Rhode ed. 2000) (emphasizing that “[a] lawyer who is doing his job well dwells in
the tension between private interest and public good, and never overcomes it. He struggles
constantly between the duty to serve his client and the equally powerful obligation to serve the
good of the law as a whole.”); see also Robert F. Drinan, New Horizons in the Role of Law
Schools in Teaching Legal Ethics, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 347, 348 (1995) (maintaining
that “[o]ne of the deepest moral convictions of the American legal profession has been that
lawyers, as officers of the court, have a duty to make certain that the administration of justice
serves everyone, including the poor”); Edwards, supra note 7, at 1427 (observing that “great
lawyers seek to serve their clients and the public good, and these commitments are not seen as
mutually exclusive”).
11. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 1151 (noting Professor Roger Cramton’s observation that
“[i]ncreasingly, many lawyers have lost a sense of obligation to courts, opponents, and the
general public”); Edwards, supra note 7, at 1423 (suggesting that by virtue of our training, “the
public has a right to assume that lawyers have attained a certain level of technical competence,
share a commitment to a defined set of ethical norms, and accept the responsibility to interpret
and practice the law in public-regarding ways”); see also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl.
(2006) (stating “[t]he practice of law is a public trust [and] [l]awyers are trustees of the system”);
Fuller & Randall, supra note 10, at 1159 (observing that “[a] profession to be worthy of the name
must inculcate in its members a strong sense of the special obligations that attach to their
calling”).
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likely among a minority of legal ethics professors who make extensive use of
this teaching style. Part I of this Article explains the reasons for my choice,
certain aspects of my specific case method, and the perceived benefits that
flow from this manner of instruction.
While I fully believe that my traditional law school modus operandi is an
efficient and effective way for me to communicate the substance of
professional responsibility, the calculated deviations that I employ are what I
consider most essential in enabling me to reach my students and memorably
impress upon them the difficulties and virtues of being a lawyer. Part II
reveals and elaborates upon the special nuances that I inject into the course as a
change of pace and a complement to my rather straightforward study of ethics
rules and cases.
Even more fundamentally, however, the goal of debunking the “Delroy
myth” inevitably occupies the forefront of my mind when teaching
professional responsibility; it informs my approach at all times and inspires my
enthusiasm for the subject. “Lawyers” and “liars” may sound alike, but it is
my hope that no one who encounters my former students will ever confuse the
two.
I. THE CASE METHOD AS A TOOL FOR PROVIDING CONTEXT AND RELEVANCE
One of the most common refrains that I receive from former students
relates to how much more sense law school courses make to them once they
become actively engaged in the practice of law. This reality is something with
which all professors must contend. Within the confines of the classroom, how
does one go about putting a law school course into a context that will cause
students to appreciate and understand both the significance and relevance of
the material to practicing law?
I think the short answer is we cannot, at least not fully. As with any
endeavor, it is simply impossible to grasp completely what the law is really
about without actual experience. My wife and I attended parenting classes and
read various books to prepare for the arrival of our first daughter, but little of
the information made sense until we ultimately became parents—in truth, some
of it ended up making no sense whatsoever, but we would not have known any
better absent being immersed in the actual parenthood enterprise.
Practice and experience truly are the best teachers, but few professors have
the luxury of being able to place their students in authentic legal settings as
part of their pedagogy. We have to figure out a meaningful alternative. For
me, at least as a starting point and frame of reference, actual cases are the
optimal tool. There are several reasons for this.
First, it is important for students to take the subject matter very seriously. I
do not want them to view their required course in legal ethics as merely some
tedious rite of passage. Students need to view professional responsibility in the
same manner that they look upon constitutional law or civil procedure. Indeed,
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I hope to impress upon them that professional responsibility is actually even
more important because it concerns the law that governs lawyers specifically.
It is the only course that focuses upon the legal rules of the profession; and
what could possibly be more significant for an aspiring attorney? In any event,
using the case method, at a minimum, causes students to equate legal ethics
with their other substantive courses.
In addition, the use of cases resembles a narrative story, adding an element
of reality to the content, causes, and effects of ethical lapses by counsel. While
hypothetical problems are definitely useful, they can, at times, come across as
unrealistic academic exercises, which may lead students to dismiss them as
impractical, even when based on real life scenarios. The familiarity and
genuineness of reported decisions, however, prevent them from being so easily
disregarded.
I must concede, though, that even with cases, students have a tendency to
view the offending lawyers as aberrational wrongdoers, and therefore, they
find it difficult to relate the dilemma presented to themselves. In an effort to
remedy this inclination, I frequently call upon a student to place himself or
herself in the precise situation of the lawyer involved. Almost inevitably, the
chosen student will initially proclaim a propensity to act differently under
similar circumstances. Further questioning and probing, however, typically
leads to greater understanding of the realities of the offending lawyer’s
situation and recognition of how difficult it probably was for him or her to
avoid the ethical transgression in question. The best example of this is the
young lawyer who fails to expose the professional misconduct of a supervisory
attorney.12 After discussing such a case, most students admit that they might
very well have acted in exactly the same manner. These honest concessions
then almost always lead to a meaningful exchange concerning alternative
strategies for dealing with such a perplexing ethical conundrum.
I employ a similar technique with regard to coverage of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Whenever we cover a case, I invariably spend a
significant amount of time parsing through the pertinent Model Rules, whether
or not they were actually discussed in the decision.13 Often, a superficial
reading will suggest a straightforward resolution of the dilemma involved.

12. One of the classic vehicles for discussing this topic is the tragic case of Joseph
Fortenberry, a talented associate at the New York law firm of Donovan, Leisure, Newton &
Irvine, whose career was derailed by his decision to remain silent after witnessing a senior partner
falsely claim to the court and opposing counsel that relevant documents had been destroyed. See
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 1101–05 (4th ed.
2005).
13. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Seeing the Trees Within the Forest: Contextualized Ethics
Courses as a Strategy for Teaching Legal Ethics, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 230 (1995)
(noting that “[a] central goal of any ethics course must be to learn to read the rules rigorously and
critically”).
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Careful dissection, however, uncovers subtle ambiguities that frequently add
surprisingly confounding levels of complexity. Model Rule 1.13 is my favorite
example of this phenomenon.
On the surface, Rule 1.13 appears to be a very powerful and demanding
rule for lawyers representing organizational clients, but closer examination can
lead one to conclude that the Rule, in actuality, can be interpreted to require
very little, if anything, from a lawyer faced with perceived organizational
wrongdoing.14 This then allows me to engage the students in a dialogue about
what attorneys in such situations should do, which in turn leads to a broader
discussion concerning the concept of professional responsibility. Specifically,
in many instances, the ethical rules ultimately leave lawyers with the task of
exercising their discretion to decide upon the appropriate course of action

14. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2007). The pertinent portion of Model
Rule 1.13 provides as follows:
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting
through its duly authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person
associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a
matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization,
and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall
proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the
lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization
to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization,
including, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest authority that can act on behalf
of the organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if
(1) despite the lawyer’s efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority
that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely
and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law,
and
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in
substantial injury to the organization,
then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not Rule
1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.
(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer’s
representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend
the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the
organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law.
(e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the
lawyer’s actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c), or who withdraws under
circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those
paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the
organization’s highest authority is informed of the lawyer’s discharge or withdrawal.
Id.
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when faced with an ethical quandary.15 The process of addressing these types
of questions in practice is truly the essence of professional responsibility. How
we choose to act in such circumstances defines both who we are individually
and collectively as a profession.
I could recount further instances of the educational benefits of the case
method in teaching professional responsibility, but suffice it to say that when
combined with exacting coverage of the rules, this approach provides an
effective and efficient way for me to contextualize legal ethics and to create a
sense of relevance for students. Admittedly, though, if used in isolation, this
instructional formula is a woefully inadequate mechanism for getting students
excited and inspired about the subject matter and the legal profession in
general. For this reason, I incorporate a few modifications to my otherwise
conventional style.
II. CALCULATED DEVIATIONS THAT ENHANCE CONTEXT AND RELEVANCE
In an effort to excite and inspire my students, I complement my
traditionalist approach with certain calculated deviations that accentuate my
ability to accomplish the overall objectives of the course. First, and perhaps
foremost, I try to make the class entertaining.
One of the most well-received attempts at entertainment is my use of
movie clips to supplement our coverage of several topics. The two most
effective clips that I show are from A Time to Kill16 and The Rainmaker.17 I
utilize A Time to Kill in connection with my treatment of the attorney-client
privilege and the duty of confidentiality. The specific scene upon which I
concentrate is an exchange that takes place between Carl Lee Hailey (Samuel
L. Jackson), the protagonist father whose young daughter has been brutally
raped, and Jake Brigance (Matthew McConaughey), a local criminal defense
lawyer.18 Their discussion occurs in Jake’s office following the apprehension

15. See id. at pmbl. ¶ 9 (indicating that “[w]ithin the framework of [the Rules of Professional
Conduct] . . . many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be
resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic
principles underlying the Rules”).
16. A TIME TO KILL (Warner Bros. 1996).
17. THE RAINMAKER (Paramount Pictures 1997). I also use clips from THE VERDICT
(Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1982) and ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia Pictures
Corp. 1959) when discussing the topics of client perjury and witness coaching.
18. See A TIME TO KILL, supra note 16. Given the violent nature of the subject matter of the
movie and the offensive language that is utilized, I am always very careful to warn my students
ahead of time. Students who are uncomfortable viewing the clip, privately communicate this fact
to me and are excused from that class session. After class I meet with them to discuss the
scenario so that they can follow and participate in future discussions concerning it.
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of the two men suspected of committing the rape.19
substance of the conversation:

Here is the critical

Carl Lee: You remember them four white boys raped that little black girl in the
Delta?
Jake: Yeah.
Carl Lee: They got off, didn’t they?
Jake: Yeah.
Carl Lee: If I was in a jam, you’d help me out, wouldn’t you Jake?
Jake: Sure Carl Lee. What kind of jam you talkin’ about?
20

Carl Lee: You got a daughter Jake; . . . what would you do?

When Jake arrives home from work that evening, he conveys the details of this
exchange to his wife, and it is apparent that Jake suspects Carl Lee might do
something violent to the accused men.21 On the following day, Carl Lee, in
fact, guns down the two defendants while they are en route to their
arraignment, and he is subsequently arrested and charged with first degree
murder.22
The first rather obvious question that I raise with my students is whether
the conversation between Jake and Carl Lee is protected by the attorney-client
privilege, putting aside for the time-being the crime-fraud exception to this
doctrine. Students invariably struggle with this question because their gut tells
them that the exchange should not be covered by the privilege, but they really
want it to be protected because they like and sympathize with Carl Lee. In
subsequent classes, we refer back to this same scene in discussing waiver of
the attorney-client privilege, the crime-fraud exception, and the duty of
confidentiality.
Use of the clip from A Time to Kill has a number of educational benefits.
First, it grabs the students’ attention. Second, it makes them think about the
material in a dynamic and challenging fashion. Third, it is highly memorable.
I would venture to guess that almost every student who has taken my course
cannot encounter an attorney-client privilege question without having at least a
momentary flashback to our discussion of A Time to Kill, and I am positive that
none of them can watch the movie again without focusing, perhaps
obsessively, on the privilege issue.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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With regard to The Rainmaker,23 I use several of its opening scenes as a
backdrop for discussing unauthorized practice of law and solicitation. The
chosen scenes are much lighter in tone than the clip from A Time to Kill, and
typically generate a good bit of laughter throughout the viewing. Most of the
examples of misconduct that are portrayed seem fairly egregious on the surface
and are obvious to the students. For example, Danny DeVito’s character, Deck
Shifflet, is engaged in the active practice of law even though he has been
unsuccessful in passing the bar despite numerous attempts—he humorously
refers to himself as a “paralawyer.”24 More subtle, however, is the fact that
Deck’s in-person solicitation of a hospitalized, incapacitated accident victim is
actually not professional misconduct for the very reason that he is not an
attorney. Rather, the attorney for whom he works, Bruiser Stone (Mickey
Rourke),25 is the one who should be held ethically responsible for Deck’s
misbehavior.26 Other blatant and not so blatant lapses in professional
responsibility pervade the scenes, and we typically have a lively and
entertaining discussion about them.
As with A Time to Kill, I consider The Rainmaker to be extremely valuable
for the purpose of making the lesson memorable. I also find that it serves as a
good exam-simulation exercise because it requires students to spot and explain
issues. Perhaps, the most significant benefit, however, is the simple injection
of some humor into the course. The subject of legal ethics is extremely
serious, but if the mood and tone of the classroom are not periodically
lightened, I fear that the course may drift towards being perceived as
sanctimonious drudgery. And if that happens, students will definitely leave the
class with the wrong perspective on their professional responsibility as
lawyers.
Another variation that I incorporate into my traditional approach is the
utilization of a group assignment. In the past, I have used two different
subjects for this portion of the class: (1) the propriety of admitting (or not
admitting) avowed white supremacist Matthew Hale to the bar;27 and (2) the
23. See THE RAINMAKER, supra note 17.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(c)(1) (2007) (“[A] lawyer shall be
responsible for conduct of [a nonlawyer] that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific
conduct, ratifies the conduct involved . . . .”); id. at R. 8.4(a) (“It is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or
induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another . . . .”).
27. Matthew Hale applied for admission to the Illinois State Bar in 1998, and his application
was initially denied based largely on the white supremacist agenda that he intended to pursue
with his law license. See In re Hale, Committee on Character and Fitness for the Third Appellate
District of the Supreme Court of Illinois (1998), reprinted in HAZARD ET AL., supra note 12, at
1037–46. This raised some obvious First Amendment concerns, but his case eventually became
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propriety of the professional discipline imposed upon President Bill Clinton for
his conduct in connection with the Paula Jones/Monica Lewinsky matter.28 I
divide the class up into randomly selected groups and assign them the task of
meeting (outside of class time) and reaching a consensus, if possible, with
regard to the chosen subject. Though these matters are addressed in the
casebook that I use,29 I require the students to do additional research to better
inform their group discussions. Each group must elect a spokesperson to
convey the sentiment of its members to the entire class, and that person is then
subject to follow-up questions from me, as well as comments and critiques
from other classmates.
Although this can be a time-consuming endeavor, taking up the better part
of two class sessions, I find that it is a very effective vehicle for discussing the
process of admission and the structure and nature of the disciplinary system.
Politics and racial attitudes inevitably come into play in our discourse, but
fortunately rarely in a destructive manner. Besides the substantive educational
benefits that flow from the group discussions, this format also usually has the
added effect of making students, thereafter, more comfortable about
volunteering their thoughts and opinions to the class. For this reason, I always
employ this deviation towards the beginning of the course.
There are several additional modifications to my traditionalist style that I
make use of, but I will conclude by simply discussing the one that I feel is the
most meaningful and important. Lawyers, by virtue of their training and their
role, occupy a very unique niche within society. As the Preamble to the Model
Rules states, a lawyer is “a public citizen having special responsibility for the

much less controversial when Hale’s undisclosed arrest record came to light. See Bob Van Voris,
Muddying the Waters—Ill. Racist’s Free Speech Case is Complicated by His Arrest Record,
NAT’L L.J., Feb. 21, 2000, at A1. The nondisclosure itself would have provided an adequate
basis for denying Hale admission, even apart from the arrests themselves. See id.; see also
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.1 (2007) (providing that “[a]n applicant . . . to the
bar . . . shall not: (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or (b) fail to disclose a
fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the
matter . . . .”). In addition, Hale most likely forever doomed his admission efforts when he was
convicted and sentenced to forty years in prison for soliciting the murder of a federal judge. See
Jodi Wilgoren, 40-Year Term for Supremacist in Plot on Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at
A16.
28. President Clinton voluntarily accepted a five-year suspension from the Arkansas State
Bar in 2001 for having provided false and misleading testimony during his deposition in the Paula
Jones litigation. See Talk Back Live: President Clinton Strikes a Deal with Independent Counsel
(CNN television broadcast Jan. 19, 2001) (transcript available at http://edition.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/0101/19/tl.00.html). The disciplinary action arose out of Judge Susan Webber
Wright’s contempt finding with regard to President Clinton and her subsequent referral of the
matter to the Arkansas Supreme Court’s Committee on Professional Conduct. See Jones v.
Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1135 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
29. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 12, at 1037–52, 1147–48.
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quality of justice.”30 The Preamble later elaborates upon this point in the
following manner:
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the
legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered
by the legal profession. . . . A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the
administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons
who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance. Therefore, all
lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic influence
to ensure equal access to our system of justice for all those who because of
economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel. A
lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should
31
help the bar regulate itself in the public interest.

Model Rule 6.1 takes this notion a step farther by expressly codifying for
lawyers the aspirational goal of fifty hours of voluntary pro bono service on
behalf of or in relation to individuals who are unable to afford legal
representation.32 The special ability that we possess to fulfill this commitment
is central to what makes the practice of law such a noble undertaking. If we
fail to live up to this aspect of our calling, then the worth of our profession is,
in my mind, diminished. As a result, above all else, I want to educate my

30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 1 (2007).
31. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 6.
32. See id. at R. 6.1. Model Rule 6.1 provides:
Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to
pay. A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal
services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should:
(a) provide a substantial majority of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or
expectation of fee to:
(1) persons of limited means or
(2) charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational
organizations in matters that are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of
limited means; and
(b) provide any additional services through:
(1) delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals,
groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or
public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational
organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the
payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization’s
economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate;
(2) delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited
means; or
(3) participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal
profession.
In addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that
provide legal services to persons of limited means.
Id.
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students about this most essential element of their professional responsibility
as lawyers.
Rather than lecture to them or regale them with heartwarming stories of
personal experiences of attorneys who have volunteered their services, I have
chosen to place them in precisely the same situation (almost) in which they
will find themselves during practice. On the first day of class, I inform them
that I will give students modest extra credit for providing at least six hours of
volunteer service to any organization or endeavor that is designed to help those
who are less fortunate.33 I provide students with some helpful reference
resources, but beyond that, it is up to them to ascertain an appropriate
volunteer opportunity. By a certain date, they are required to submit to me in
writing a description of their proposed volunteer activity for my approval.
Following the completion of their work, students must submit a written report
to me that describes what they did, why they selected it, and most importantly,
what they got out of it. Here is a small sampling of the types of organizations
and activities that students have chosen: (1) Habitat for Humanity, (2) Sexual
Assault Center, (3) Boys & Girls Club, (4) Athens Justice Project (which
provides pro bono legal representation, support, and guidance to criminal
defendants who exhibit a sincere desire to change their lives), (5) Project Safe
(which provides safe haven to female victims of domestic violence and their
children), (6) elementary school tutoring, (7) working in soup kitchens,
(8) volunteering at homeless shelters, and (9) visiting adult assisted living
facilities.
Typically, a large percentage of the class will successfully complete the
assignment and receive some level of extra credit. The vast majority have
extraordinarily positive experiences, often communicated to me in genuinely
heart-warming prose. One of my favorites is from a student who chose to
volunteer in a homeless shelter, and his reflections capture very nicely what I
have found to be the general sentiment of those who undertake the extra credit
project:
The experience was a reality check for [me]. Life in law school is very
demanding and sometimes I, like other classmates, feel as if I’ll never make it
through. I have also found myself commiserating with others about our job
searches and not getting the results [for which] we had hoped. This
experience, though, reminded me that no matter how hard my life in law
school gets, or no matter how many rejection letters I might receive, there are
many, many less fortunate people in the world. This experience put all of my
problems into perspective. Things that I thought were the most important in
my life took a back seat for this time. After seeing what others go through on a
33. In light of unauthorized practice restrictions, students’ volunteer efforts need not be
related directly to any sort of legal representation. The critical requirement is that whatever they
select must be geared towards helping the less fortunate in our community. In addition, it should
be noted that many of my students exceed the six-hour minimum volunteer requirement.
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daily basis, just to survive, I was reminded just how fortunate I have been in
life.
If there is one important lesson to take from this experience, it is that I
should never take the things I have for granted. I must appreciate what life
gives me, but at the same time, I must give something back. Taking time out
of my life to help others in need really should not be the result of an extra
credit assignment. This is one experience that I will take from law school and
34
not soon forget.

Not even the most adept instructor could effect such a profound and lasting
impression upon a future member of our profession. I view such an experience
as the quintessential complement to the remainder of my teaching efforts. It is
the capstone that enables students to comprehend the true magnitude of their
professional calling and hopefully whets their appetites with regard to the
enormous good that they can accomplish within the legal system, as well as
society at large. This is the essence of a lawyer’s professional responsibility,
and as a teacher, this is what I strive to convey by word, example, and
experience, above all else.
CONCLUSION
In teaching professional responsibility, professors must select the approach
that most appropriately suits them, their perspective, and their audience.
Regardless of chosen pedagogy, however, we all share a common goal that
unifies our mission. Simply put, we must prepare our students to disarm
unflattering perceptions of lawyers as ethically void by instilling in them a
desire to always do what is right, along with a commitment to serve the public
good,35 treat others with dignity and respect, and restore honor to this most
noble profession.36 It is an uncomplicated premise with which few can
reasonably disagree. Nevertheless, comments such as those by Delroy vividly
display that teachers of legal ethics have an extraordinarily challenging and
complex task, but one that could not possibly be more worthwhile.

34. Student Pro Bono Extra Credit Report (on file with the author).
35. See Fuller & Randall, supra note 10, at 1216 (noting that “[p]opular misconceptions of
the advocate’s function disappear when the lawyer pleads without a fee, and the true value of his
service to society is immediately perceived”).
36. See Edwards, supra note 7, at 1429 (“[W]hen students graduate from law schools, they
should have more than a good understanding of the ethical standards of the profession. They
should also have a clear sense of our highest ideals.”); see also Edwards, supra note 1, at 1161
(observing that “if academicians abdicate their duty to communicate the profession’s traditional
commitment to the public good, they deliver students by default to the forces supporting an
unbridled corporatizing of the profession”).
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